In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” (viii) comes to fruition. : Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ( ): Miranda Fricker: Books. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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In particular, the book constitutes a striking example of how contemporary epistemology can be enriched by a close attention to our experiences, and of how our understanding of epistemic matters can be deepened through the deployment of ideas from ethics, plitical theory and feminist philosophy. Find it on Scholar. The book consists of an introduction, seven chapters, and a brief conclusion. Sign in Create an account. Testimonial Injustice Without Credibility Deficit. Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance.
An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3: University Press Scholarship Frickfr.
Miranda Fricker – Wikipedia
That a person’s capacity to claim recognition as a conveyer of knowledge, a bona fide informant, is essential to her or his achieving human value in a first- second- and third-personal sense is the deep thought that grounds the argument and carries it forward. Oxford University Press is a injusticee of the University of Oxford.
David Enoch – – Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1: Sign in to use this feature. Retrieved 8 March Gaile Pohlhaus – – Hypatia 27 4: Rachel McKinnon – – Philosophy Compass 11 8: In so doing it moves epistemology into places where knowing matters to people’s lives, and where formal analyses abstracted from situations and experiences offer minimal guidance for good epistemic conduct.
Hermeneutical Injustice Conclusion Index. Hermeneutical injustice is the kind of injustice experienced by groups who, because due to prejudice they have been less able to participate in the practices that generate new concepts e.
Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed. Ethics of Belief in Epistemology.
Her readers will look forward to the next phase of this creative, vitally important project. Indeed, acknowledging the unjust fricmer gender or racial injustcie afford to people as members of the dominant sex or race exacts a price: Yet she acknowledges a widespread human susceptibility to relying on negatively, harmfully prejudiced stereotypes, and shows how difficult it is unequivocally to attribute culpability to their users, given that stereotypes and images “can operate beneath the radar of our ordinary doxastic self-scrutiny, sometimes even despite beliefs to the contrary” Not being asked blocks possibilities of epistemic collaboration, contestation, negotiation; it silences the voices of the powerless, objectifies them epistemically, thereby again enacting patterns of dehumanizing testimonial injustice that the preempt the exchanges — the team-work in Craig’s words — on which viable epistemic community depends.
Anyone whose philosophical interest in the concept of knowledge extends beyond merely definitional issues, and addresses its ethical and political dimensions as well as its genealogy, can ill afford to ignore this book” — Axel Gelfert, Times Literary Supplement.
In chapter 2 the analysis expands to focus on stereotypes as themselves stereotypical vehicles of prejudice, in what Fricker calls “the credibility economy” 30 ff.
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Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice. With this book Miranda Fricker has opened space for the new meanings the “more squarely political” analysis will require.
Classical, Early, and Medieval World History: Heather Battaly – – Philosophy Compass 3 4: It can also undermine a person in her own conviction that she counts as a possessor or conveyer of knowledge: She identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: Worth noting, too, is Fricker’s reading of Simone de Beauvoir’s “epistemic humiliation” in a well-known argument with Jean-Paul Sartre: Ignorance and Moral Obligation Michael J.